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SOME NOTES ON JAPANtS FOREIGN TRADE 
Part I Short History of Japan's Foreign trade 
In the Pre-War Period 
Kiyoshi MATSUI* 
I. Foreword 
In tracing the history of Japan's pre-war foreign trade, the "Classified 
Annals of Japan's Trade," compiled by the Toyo Keizai Shimpo-sha (the 
Oriental Economist Co_, Ltd_) has been most widely utilized_ 
According to the publication, the period between 1868 (1st year of Me-
iji) and 1934 (9th year of Showa) is divided into nine sub-periods, the cha-
racteristic features of each of these sub-periods being described as follows. 
( 1) 1868-1881 (1st year-14th year of Meiji). 
This period witnessed a big confusion in the currency system due to 
the discrepancy in the price of gold and silver in Japan as compared with 
that prevailing in Western countries as well as the unrestricted issuance of 
inconvertible paper currency. The confusion entailed a drastic drop in the 
currency value, a sharp rise in commodity prices, an unfavorable trade ba-
lance and a continuous flow of gold and silver. 
(2) 1882-1893 (15th year-26th year of Meiji). 
During this period, the issuance of inconvertible notes was curtailed. 
In 1886, the silver standard system was adopted. Japan's foreign trade in 
this period showed an excess of exports······a rare phenomenon. 
(3) 1894-1903 (27th year-36th year of Meiji). 
A period between the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. Japan 
received the payment of the war indemnity by the defeated China, part of 
which was utilized for adoption of the gold standard system in 1897. 
(4) 1904-1914 (37th year of Meiji-3rd year of Taisho). 
A period from the Russo-Japanese War to the World War 1. Large 
amounts of foreign capital flowed into Japan during this period. The Japan-
version of an industrial revolution, which had commenced during the preced-
ing period, now came to a standstill, foreign trade balance continuing in 
imports excess. 
* Professor of Economics at Kyoto University. 
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(5) 1915-1918 (4th year-7th year of Taisho). 
This period covers the duration of the World War I. For a second 
time since the start of Meiji, Japan's foreign trade continued a favorable 
balance. The period, however, lasted for only four years. 
(6) 1919-1921 (8th year-10th year of Taisho). 
In the spring of 1920, Japan experienced a big business recession. While 
foreign trade showed big imports excess, the stock of specie handed over from 
the preceding period enabled Japan to meet overseas payments. With respect 
to gold and silver, trade balance remained in imports excess. 
( 7) 1922-1929 (lIth year of Taisho-4th year of Showa). 
Foreign trade remained in unfavorable balance. Foreign exchange saw a 
drastic decline. In 1929, the gold embargo was lifted. 
( 8) 1930-1931 (5th year-6th year of Showa). 
The gold standard system remained in full force. Embroiled in the 
worldwide economic crisis, Japan, too had to experience an unprecedented 
difficulties. 
( 9) 1932-1934 (7th year-9th year of Showa). 
In 1931, gold embargo was again enforced, which heralded the subse. 
quent foreign exchange decline and the expansion of exports. 
The amounts of exports and imports in these succeeding periods are as 
shown below. 
Amounts of Exports and Imports in Succeeding Periods. 











Japan Proper and Karafuto 
Exports Imports of Exports (+) I I 
Excess 
of Imports (-) 
379,8881 302,243 -77,645 
699,006 629.192 ' +69,814 
1,915,605 2,267,568 -351,963 
4,944,731 5,525,806 -581,075 
5,400,881 3,992,833 + 1,408,048 
5,300,106 6,123,790 I -823,684 




5,442,962 5,631,212 -188,250 
Japanese Empire (including overseas 
territories and special trade) 
I 
I I Excess Exports Imports of Exports (+) 
of Imports - ) 
302,243 I 379,888 -77,645 
2 699,824 I 635.022 +64,801 
3 2,065,712 2,563,162 -497,449 
4 5,311,204 5,971,421 -660,217 
5 5,729,073 4,268,968 + 1,460,105 
6 5,694,163 6,726,972 -1,032,809 
7 16,292,287 19,501,386 -3,209,102 
8 2,771,494 1 3,018,416 -246,920 
9 5,759,285* 5,972,632 -213,347 
* Note. Amount of imports of specially-designated 
commodities in 1934 (9th year of Showa) is esti_ 
mated as the same as the preceding year. B .. ed 
on "Classified Annals of Japan's Foreign Trade." 
As is shown above, the classification into the succeeding periods, as fol. 
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lowed in the "Classified Annals of Japan's Foreign Trade," evidently places 
main emphasis on Japan's international payments, and changes in commodity 
prices and currency value related thereto. 
The second classification followed by the afore-mentioned publication is 
based on the statistical trends of trade volume. Reference, in this connection, 
is made to the following table. 
1st period I 2nd period I 3rd period 4th period 
1873-1885 I 1885-1915 I 1915-1919 1919-1934 
Aggregate volume of 
exports and imports 100 186.4 100 877.3 100 131.5 100 190.0 
Value 100 132.4 100 1814.2 100 340.7 100 100.5 
Price per unit 100 71.0 100 207.0 100 259.2 100 52.9 
Eased on the "ClassIfied Annals of Japan's Foreign Trade." 
While the amount for the first period registered at increase of 86.4 %, 
the increase in value remained at mere 32.4 %. This was because the price 
per unit of the trade commodities dropped by 29 %. 
In the second period, the amount recorded an increase of 777.3 %, ac-
companied with an increase in value by 1714.2 %, mainly because of 107 % 
increase in the price per unit of export and import goods. 
In the third period, the sharp rise in the price per unit is seen to have 
brought a bigger rise in the value than in the amount. 
In the fourth period, the value remained practically unchanged in spite 
of 90 % increase in the amount. This was due to a sharp decline of 47,1 % 
seen in the price per unit. 
Thus, it is seen that the method of classification into periods, followed 
in the "Classified Annals of Japan's Foreign Trade," is based, firstly, mainly 
on short-term fluctuations in the balance of payments, and, secondly, on long-
term changes in the trade volume. Namely, the classification, in both cases, 
is based on quantitative changes in foreign trade, and, so long as the publica-
tion in question is a statistical study, this should be considered just and 
proper. 
It is needless to say, however, that such quantitative changes are a result 
of the structural changes of Japan's economy in its relation to world economy. 
Accordingly, for a correct tracing of the growth of Japan's foreign trade, a 
thorough comprehension of its quantitative changes in relation to the changes 
brought about in the structure of Japan's economy would seem necessary. 
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II. Foreign Trade in Initial Stages of CapitalisDl. 
According to the classification tried in the "Classified Annals of Japan's 
Foreign Trade," the initial stages cover the first and second periods. 
In the first period, the Meiji regime, among others, undertook· a land 
reform and measures for encouraging the inflationary trends, which, combined, 
worked for the accumulation of domestic capital, paving the way for the 
subsequent growth of capitalism in Japan. 
In foreign trade, Japan was experiencing an import excess. Terms of 
trade transactions were highly unfavorable for Japan. It was only in the 
second period that the foreign trade balance turned to export excess and terms 
of transactions were improved, when capital accumulation by dint of foreign 
trade was made possible. 
Through the first and second periods, thus, Japan saw a so-called urac-
cumulation of capital, the process of which, however, was considerably dif-
ferent from what it had been in some of the advanced Western countries, 
for Japan's economy, belatedly participating in world economy, had inevitably 
to endeavor for capital accui:nulation under various forms of political and 
economic pressures made to bear upon her by the Western countries. 
Japan entered into normal trade relations with foreign countries, for the 
first time, through the Japan-America Treaty of Amity, 1854, and the Japan-
America Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, 1858 .. During the 1850s, the 
capitalist economy in Western countries had already reached a stage of ma-
turity. The Industrial Revolution started by England in 1760-1770, had 
completed itself during the first half of the nineteenth century and with Eng-
land and France as the leaders, and closely followed by Germany and Ame-
rica, the Western Powers, in their role of advanced capitalist countries, were 
heading toward their respective expansion on a worldwide scale. 
Until Japan was opened to foreign trade in 1854, she had been in a 
. state of complete seclusion from the outside world for three centuries, under 
the feudalistic rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate. This, unavoidably, forced 
. Japan to lag far behind some of the European and American countries. 
This, however, does not at once signify that Japan's erstwhile feudalistic 
society did not harbor any seedlings for a subsequent capitalistic growth. 
While, superficially, Tokugawa's rule extending for three hundred years, ap-
parently, was stable, its foundation had continuously been shaken by the 
growth of commodity economy, the intensification of contradictions inherent in 
the feudalism and an incessant series of farmers' riots. Tokugawa's Shogunate 
rule, thus, was destined to collapse sooner or later, as it was found to be a 
great obstacle in the way of the inevit<\bJe evolution of hum<\n history. Of 
SOME NOTES ON JAPAN'S FOREIGN TRADE 23 
course, it may even be said that the very policy of national seclusion had 
been intended as a means of postponing the day of final liquidation of the 
Tokugawa system. This should be considered the very factor which, on the 
heels of the opening of the country to foreign intercourse and the consequent 
flow into the country of Western goods, resulting in the rapid growth of com-
modity economy, aided to intensify the contradictions of the feudal system 
to such an extent that the Tokugawa Shogunate, in the form as it was then, 
,could not hope to maintain its sway any longer. Coupled with the internal 
disturbances was the pressure brought to bear upon Japan at the hands of 
the Western countries. Japan's opening of her country to foreign trade, orig-
inally, was not the result of her own requirement, but was a result of coer-
cion by foreign powers, who desired that Japan be opened to them as a 
,market, in a broad sense, for their merchandise. The combined pressure of 
these contradictions, both internal and external, eventually forced the Toku-
gawa Shogunate to collapse, replaced by the Meiji regime. 
The Meiji Restoration, however, could not follw the pattern of the Wes-
tern bourgeois democratic revolutions, which aimed at a drastic eradication 
of the feudalistic heritage and placing powers in the hands of the newly-rising 
bourgeoisie. The Meiji reform had some feudalistic mechanisms left unch-
anged. But, it should be noted that the renovation of Meiji truly ushered 
in a modem Japan, which quickly had to trace its steps along the road of 
modern capitalism. Thus were the initial stages of the Japanese version of 
,capitalism entered into. With many points of dissimilarity with the Western 
patterns, some of its salient features may pertinently be explained in the fol-
lowing lines. 
( a) Usually, foreign trade in the embryonic stages of capitalism will 
develop a brilliant commercial competition by utilizing the vast colonial 
system, and, thus, will aim at accumulating capital on a major scale. In 
the case of Japan, however, there were no colonies to make use of, and, 
on the contrary, Japan herself was alotted the role of a market for foreign 
capitalism, and, moreover, the formations of production, as were, available 
then, were still engrossed in feudalistic relations. This resulted in the conti-
nued import excess for Japan's foreign trade during the 1868-1881 period, 
except two years, 1868 and 1876. Accumulation of capital during this pe-
riod, thus, had to be achieved through a series of domestic measures, inclu-
ding a land reform and encouragement of inflationary trends. The readjust-
ment of the monetary system, successfully executed subsequently, enabled 
,Japan's foreign trade to register a favorable balance between 1882 and 1889, 
. with the terms of transactions, too, being steadily improved. Japan, for the 
first time, could hope for an accumulation of capital by dint of her foreign 
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trade. A checkup of the commodities traded reveals that all ranges of capi. 
talistic commodities, whether they are consumption or production goods, were 
imported, while only such locally-produced, souvenir.like items as raw silk 
and tea were exported. 
( b) The European countries and the United States, combined,accounted 
for 70-80 % as the countries of destination in Japan's foreign trade, while 
trade with Asiatic countries, which later were destined to rise to the positions 
of principal countries of destination as far as Japan's foreign trade was con-
cerned, was still negligible. 
( c) A predominating portion of Japan's foreign trade was conducted 
at the hands of foreign firms. 
( d) The customs duties, on the other hand, were imposed both on 
exports and imports, to the amount of 5 % ad valorem, by virtue of the pro-
.visions of the Treaty of Commerce of 1858 and the Agreement on Revised 
Tariffs of 1866. 
m. Foreign Trade in Period When Capitalistic 
Foundations Were Consolidated. 
This period roughly corresponds to the third period as mentioned in the 
above-quoted" Classified Annals of Japan's Foreign trade." The period in 
question saw the process of industrial revolution and of the adoption of the 
gold standard system, on the basis of which, the Japanese capitalism was 
consolidated more or less firmly. Japan had to take part in the intense' in-
·ternational competition, lagging far behind the advanced Western Powers, and, 
thus, was compelled to make up for her inferior technical levels with a lower 
wage of labor. Even with cheap labor as a weapon, however, Japan's ex-
ports were unable to adequately meet the bigger import requirements arising 
out of a rapid economic growth, and Japan's trade balance, except several 
years during the World War I, was destined to register a chronic state of 
import excess. Such peculiarity in the structure of Japan's foreign trade, it 
may be noted, was first made manifest in this period. 
In the capitalistic setup, generally, foreign trade is conducted on the 
basis of price and the labor cost constituting its sublayer. Commodities pro-
. duced at lower cost may be exported, while those produced at higher cost 
-may be imported. The so-called theory of comparative productive cost is 
the result of an atempt to classify the circumstance involved herein. 
It should be noted, however, that the structure of the comparative cost 
is determined within the framework of economic development of a particular 
country. Generally, it may be conceded that an industry which has witnes-
sed a further development under the capitalistic system is enabled to produce 
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at a low cost compared with another which has failed to achieve that extent 
of growth. And, as the former naturally is expected to produce more than 
the latter of lesser development, the former will be unable to find a suffici-
ently big market at home, and, consequently, will be forced to go out for 
competition on a foreign market, with its lower cost as a weapon. Further-
more, the raw materials produced home will be found inadequate to feed it, 
with the result that it will have to import from abroad whatever raw ma-
terials it needs. 
What, then, was the situation of Japan? 
The Meiji reform failed to completely eradicate the feudalistic heritage 
in agriculture which was allowed to remain more or less intact, and the 
structure of the comparative cost, due to the persistent unbalance in the gro-
·wth of various industries, had to assume a peculiar shape. 
First, it should be pointed out that, as agriculture permitted the old 
systems to be retained, the unbalance between agriculture and industry beca-
me especially striking. Thus, Japan's dependence on foreign trade had to 
become high in the sense that more advanced industrial products were ex-
ported while less advanced agricultural products were imported. The case of 
the spinning industry may be cited to illustrate this. The industry, rapidly 
growing big, turned to export its products, cotton yarn and cloth while raw 
. cotton had to be imported as a raw material to feed it. Thus, the industry's 
dependence on foreign trade, both ways, became increasingly higher. 
Secondly, cheap labor supplied by Japan's farming districts aided in re-
ducing the wage cost of her products and implement her competitive power 
on foreign markets. The low wage cost comes either from a high labor pro-
ductivity or from a low money wage level. In the case of Japan, the low 
money wage level has invariably accounted for such a situation, and, even 
in case that wage level was raised by dint of an improvement brought into 
·Iabor productivity, the level remained sufficiently low in comparison with 
what prevailed in foreign countries. 
Thirdly, the characteristic feature of Japan as a newly-rising capitalist 
country consisted in her peculiar trade setup of exporting consumption goods, 
mainly fibre products, and importing production goods, military supplies and 
munitions. 
Different from what it had been for the period of a little more than 
.twenty years following the Meiji Restoration, the foreign trade in this period 
. was undertaken by the capitalistic industry itself as the principal driving force. 
Together with this, it was felt that a revision of the old unequal tariffs was 
urgently required; effort exerted for the purpose for a long period of years 
eventually culminated in the initial revision of the treaties in 1899, which, 
26 K. MATSUI 
though incompletely, established lapan's autonomous position in regard to 
tariffs. This, considered in conjunction with the adoption of the gold stan-
·dard system in 1897, may make it reasonable to call this period one of con-
solidation of the capitalistic setup in Japan. 
IV. Period of Transition to the Monopolistic Capital-
ism to the First World War. 
The period corresponds to the fourth and fifth periods according to the 
classification followed in the "Classified Annals of Japan's Foreign Trade," 
mentioned above. 
In the fourth period, the industrial revolution in Japan began to face a 
standstill, and, coupled with worldwide business depression, the exports had 
a difficulty in realizing further expansion, the trade balance presenting a hi-
ghly unfavorable aspect. To add up, to this, the sustained drive to expand 
. exports led to worsen the terms of transactions, which had managed to keep 
a tendency of becoming more favorable in the foregoing period. 
With the World War I breaking out at this juncture, the stalemate be-
ing faced by the industrial capital gave rise to a tendency toward capital mo-
nopolization, although such was still in an embryonic stage. 
It goes without saying that the transition of Japan's capitalism to a stage 
of monopolistic capitalism was largely affected by the then-prevailing inter-
national situation. In the advanced capitalist countries of the world, the 
tendenty toward such monopolization was in evidence already in the l870s, 
and, in the sphere of international economy, likewise, transition to a division 
of the world by force from the old liberalism was to be noted. By the first 
years of the 20th century, the African Continent had largely been divided 
into colonies of the European Powers, while, in Asia, a bitter competition 
took place among Britain, Russia and the United States, centering around 
China, in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895. Seen on the world-
wide scale, the period immediately before and after 1900 could be called the 
time when world capitalism underwent a transition to a stage of monopoli-
stic capitalism. 
Following her victory in the Sino-Japanese War, Japan had Formosa and 
Liaotung peninsula ceded to her, and had embarked upon her forceful inroads 
into Korea and Manchuria. In 1904, a conflict about Korea and Manchuria 
led to a war between Japan and Czarist Russia. Prior to this, the government-
run Yawata Iron Works had started operation in 1901, and, in 1906, imme-
diately following the Russo-Japanese War, the railways in the country were 
placed under State management, and an Imperial decree promulgated in the 
same year provided for the establishment of the South Manchuria Railway 
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Company. This was followed by the inauguration of a cooperative for ex-
port cifcotton cloth to Manchuria, and, in 1910, Korea was annexed to 
Japan. These events, occurring in succession, amply indicate that the time 
was steadily moving into a period of capital monopolization. 
The following factors may probably be cited as the reasons for the suc-
cessful transition to a period of capital monopolization after barely ten years 
following the consolidation of the capitalistic institution in Japan. 
First should be cited the fact that the advanced Western capitalist countries 
surrounding Japan had earlier completed their respective process of transition 
to monopolization, and, therefore, Japan was in a position to hurriedly pre-
pare for it. Secondly, Japan's capitalism, from the peculiar condition of its 
growth, had from the outset required a foreign market for industries, because 
the domestic market was too small for the purpose. 
Thus, capitalism in Japan had to move to a stage of monopolization 
while it was still immature, a full-fledged monopolization taking shape only 
·after the first World War. 
In the fourth period according to the classification in "The Classified 
Annals of japan's Foreign Trade," it is stated Japan's economy had to import 
foreign capital amounting to ¥ 1,800,000,000, and, thus, it is evident that 
Japan used to be a capital-importing country instead of a capital-exporter. 
During the World War I, while the Western Powers, engrossed in war, 
had no time to tum their eyes to the Asiatic market, Japan could make a 
determined and monopolistic advance into the markets in not only China and 
the southeast Asiatic areas but also in Africa, which resulted in a spectacular 
growth of Japan's foreign trade. This period, corresponding to the fifth period 
in The Classified annals of Japan's Foreign Trade," witnessed, for the first 
time after a long interval, a state of excess receipts over payments in her 
foreign trade balances. 
Outstanding in the changes brought in the economic setup of Japan dur-
ing the particular period, should be noted a marked advance of industrial 
mechanization keeping pace with the growth of such modem heavy industries 
as chemical, shipbuilding, electric and mining industries. At the same time, 
the trends for enterprise monopolization continued to. become more and more 
manifest. And, it was only natural that such change in the economic struc-
. ture should be copied in the foreign trade situation. To exemplify this, the 
export merchandise came to include more finished goods than semi-finished 
ones (e.g. cotton cloth rather than cotton yam), while less items of heavy 
chemical products were imported. 
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V. Post-War crisis and the Period of Recovery TherefrolU. 
( I) Period of Post-War crisis. 
This period corresponds to the sixth and seventh periods as mentioned 
in "The Classified Annals of Japan's Foreign Trade," which states: 
"Through both periods under review, the amount of exports in value 
(annual average) registered a certain increase. On the other hand, the increase 
in the imports was more than double the amount for the preceding period. 
The result was such a big import excess, the like of which had never been 
seen before nor would it likely be seen again in the future." 
The terms of transactions, however, not entirely unfavorable, presumably 
because of the after effect of the business boom recorded during the first 
World War. It was noted, however, that further continuance of business 
depression was likely to usher in conditions where the terms of transactions 
were inevitably to tum more unfavorable for Japan. 
It was a matter of course that the post-war crisis seen in Japan was clo-
sely related to the worldwide crisis felt by capitalism. 
While the first World War was still in progress, the Soviet Union came 
into being as the world's first Socialist country. The fact was significant 
because it ushered in a new age in the world's history, where a Socialist 
system and a Capitalist system would share its respective existence on the 
globe, a situation characterized by the contemporary people as a crisis for the 
capitalist system or a crisis for the entire world. 
Capitalism in Japan, which had been allowed to register a rapid and 
spectacular growth owing to a number of favorable conditions during the 
global war, proved actually the weakest in the world capitalist system, and 
was able to enjoy a business boom for only a year after the close of the war, 
for, with a brief period of widest speculations as the last mark reminiscent 
of the fast-receding prosperity, Japan was destined to play the role of the 
harbinger of the subsequent post-war economic crisis engulfing the entire 
world. 
The post-war crisis was kicked off by the record decline of the stock 
market in March, 1920, the repercussions quickly spreading to America and 
England. There, however, the crisis could last for only a brief period: it 
was tided over. World capitalism soon freed itself from the post-war confu-
sion, and, from about 1923, most of the Western Capitalism countries coul(). 
greet a period of relative stability. 
The situation was somewhat different with the plight of Capitalism in 
Japan. Amidst the intensified international competition on the Asiatic mar-
ket, where European commodities began to flow with increasing rapidity, the 
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weaknesses of Japan's capitalism had to be exposed. Her exports faced a 
serious stalemate. Subsidizing loans from the government proved inadequate 
to let Japan's economy tide over the business recession which chronically re-
mained to harass Japan's foreign trade through the post-war years. In the 
wake of the bank panic of 1922 and the great earthquake disaster of 1923, 
similar government loans were advanced, which, however, tended to encourage 
concentration of capital, entailing the decline and collapse of many small and 
medium-sized enterprises which had mushroomed during the first World War, 
while, on the other hand, spurring further strengthening of the sway of the 
financial magnates. 
The spectacular increase of imports after the 1923 earthquake disaster 
brought the unfavorable trade balance to the unprecedentedly enormous figure 
of more than ¥ 640,000,000. The accumulation of such conditions of post-
war economic instability was mainly responsible for the big financial panic 
seen in 1927. 
While most of the World Powers, following the end of the 1914-18 war, 
successively returned to the old gold standard system, Japan alone had to lag 
behind. Indeed, she had to decree gold embargo in 1917, and, in the midst 
of the sustained economic instability, had to see her foreign exchange greatly 
fluctuate. The situation was made even worse as a sequence to her political 
confrontation with the United States. For her, the time for lifting the gold 
embargo was not yet in sight. 
The financial panic in 1927 for a time apparently postponed the time 
for lifting its gold embargo indefinitely. In the light of the consequence it 
entailed, however, it did speed up the time. The capitalist financier attemp-
ted to complete a process of industrial rationalization on the capitalistic basis, 
by lifting the gold embargo. In the meantime, the Hamaguchi Cabinet, on 
the Minseito party ticket, was organized. The new regime, at the hands of 
Junnosuke Inoue, its Finance Minister, took deflationary measures, favorable 
to capitalist financiers, while in the field of diplomacy, its Foreign Mini-
ster, Baron Kijuro Shidehara, adopted a policy of conciliation and coopera-
tion with Britain and the United States. Through the Yokohama Specie 
Bank, gold bullion was exported with which to buy foreign capital, while 
the Anglo-American markets granted to Japan loans aggregating ¥ 100,000,000 
in value. 
The lifting of gold embargo decreed in Jaunary, 1930, was significantly 
carried out in the midst of the great worldwide crisis, which brought the 
post-war period of relative stability to an end. The determined step brought 
in its wake an enormous flow of the specie, which amounted to ¥275,523,000 
during 1930, and ¥ 433,100,000 during 1931, while, at the same time, it 
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worked for a sharp drop in commodity prices, a drastic wage cut as wen as 
for a trend toward industrial rationalization, which mainly aimed at added 
burdens of labor. This inevitably resulted in a vast horde of the unemployed. 
The industrial crisis, coupled with the agricultural crisis, added to its 
intensity, while the farming districts suffered from an aggravated condition 
of poverty and destitution. 
Keeping pace with the progress of the world crisis, the currency system 
of the world faced a grave menace. Spurred on by the moratorium impo-
sed on foreign bonds by Germany, Britain, in september 1931, moved to 
suspend her gold standard system, which, together, meant a serious threat to 
the standard currencies. In Japan, the situation was utilized in certain quar-
ters for" dollar purchases," which, in turn, prompted the flow of the specie. 
The situation aggravated to such an extent that, in December that year, less 
than two years after the gold embargo was lifted, the government was forced 
to place gold under embargo for a second time. This was immediately fol-
lowed, on the part of the government, by a shift to an inflationary policy 
from the deflationary it had hitherto followed. Japan's foreign exchange 
rate against the American dollar, as a consequence, declined to $ 28.l2 a-
gainst ¥ 100, in 1932, and $ 25.23 in 1933, from $ 48.87 in 1931. 
Fluctuations in Exchange Rate Aga;,nst Pound Sterling and Dollar up to 
Lifting of Gold Embargo. 
Years I Exchange Rate Exchange Rate Against ¥ (I) Against ¥ (100) Remarks (Shilling.Pence) (Dollar) 
1913-14 
average 2- 0.302 49.305 Before the war. 
1915-18 Excess receipts during war 
/I 2- 1.332 50.190 (gold embargo, Sep. 1917). 
1919-23 Trade belance turns to unfavo~ 
/I 2- 3.674 49.017 rable (gold embargo lifted in 
America, June, 1919.) 
1924 /I 1-10.773 41.978 Vast import excess after earth~ 
quake (earthquake, Sep. 1, 1923). 
1925 /I 1- 8.273 40.801 Preparing for lifting of gold em-
1926 /I 1-11.140 46.856 bargo (Trend for return to gold 
standard). 
1927 /I 1-11.408 47.425 Financial crisis, counter-meas-
1928 /I 1-10.907 46.457 ures taken (policy for gold em-
bargo lifting collapses). 
1929 /I 1-10.755 46.070 After July, gold embargo 
lifting prepared for. 
1930 /I 2- 0.342 49.367 Gold embargo lifted on January 
11. 
At par 2- 0.582 49.846 
(Note): Based on .. Development of Japan's Industry and Foreign Trade," compiled 
by the Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute. 
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(2) Period of Recovery from World crisis. 
This period corresponds to the eighth and ninth periods of" The Clas-
sified Annals of Japan's Foreign Trade" 
During the eighth period, Japan's exports and imports showed a sharp 
decline, due to the prevailing worldwide~ economic crisis, while, in the suc-
ceeding ninth periods policies of dumping were adopted in an effort to tide 
over the crisis, which forced the terms of transactions to extremely deteriorate. 
As indicated in the statistics below, the indication for recovery in the 
volume of trade was simply a result of dumping in terms of price, exchange 
rate and wages. 
Meanwhile, big capitalists embarked on a movement for cartel aiming 
at production curtailment and agreement on sale price and exports. Respon-
ding to the move among the major capitalists, the government undertook to 
launch upon a policy of "industrial rationalization," which brought about, 
in rapid succession, the enactment of the Law for Control of Important In-
dustries and the Law for Industrial Cooperatives, and the revision of the Law 
for Export Cooperatives, in 1931, and that of the Law for Commercial 
Cooperatives, in 1932. This shows that the State intervened in the move-
ment for cartel, where concentration of and monopolization by, capital, 
was subsidized and encouraged. With the Manchurian Incident and the se-
cond embargo on gold as a turning point, capitalism in Japan entered into 
a new era, which was generally known as one of semi-wartime system, which, 
substantially, meant, economically, a State monopoly, and, politically, em-
ergence of fascism. 
These new trends could not but be reflected on foreign trade. Japan's 
foreign trade in 1930, when worldwide crisis was intensified, witnessed a dra-
stic decline both in exports and imports, owing to a decline of exports of 
raw silk to the United States, inactivity of trade with China due to a sharp 
drop in the price of silver ingot, rise in the exchange rate on the heels of 
the lifting of the gold embargo and the decline in the domestic purchasing 
power entailed by the enforcement of a deflationary policy. Compared with 
the 1929 level, the percentage of exports for that particular year stood at 
33.1 % and that of imports at 30.2 %. The amount of exports standing at 
¥ 1,147,000,000 and that of imports at ¥ 1,236,000,000 for 1931, signify that 
the volume of Japan's foreign trade had receded to the level of 1917, fifteen 
years preceding. This, again, was just a half of what the trade volume was 
in 1925, when it stood at the highest level, amounting to ¥ 2,306,000,000 
for exports and ¥ 2,573,000,000 for imports. It should be noted, however, 
that, in spite of such a sharp decline in value, quantities both of exports and 
imports did not register any drastic decrease, the decline in value being evi-
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dently due to a sharp decline in the price of each of traded merchandise. 
Especially striking was the drop in the export price. The terms of transac-
tions during the period under review showed a marked deterioration, and 
there were indications that an era of genuine dumping had set in. 
In 1932, however, Japan's foreign trade indicated strong signs that it was 
Volume of Exports and Imports in Value and Indices for Quantity and Unit Price. 
Years Value (¥ I-million) I 
Quantity Indices Unit Price Indices 
( 1923-100) (1928-100) 
Exports I Imports I Excess I Exports I Impons I Exports 
---""--
I Imports 
1929 2.149 2,216 - 68 111.2 104.8 98.0 96.2 
1930 1,470 1,546 
- 76 102.6 92.1 72.7 76.5 
1931 1,147 1,236 - 89 105.8 102.2 55.0 55.1 
1932 1,410 1,431 - 21 125.0 100.9 57.2 64.6 
1933 1,861 1,917 - 56 138.1 104.6 68.3 83.4 
1934 2,172 2,283 -111 163.4 111.6 67.4 93.1 
1935 2,499 2,472 + 27 185.3 116.9 68.4 96.3 
1936 2,693 2,764 - 71 202.5 128.4 67.5 98.0 
1937 3,175 3,783 -608 210.7 136.5 76.4 126.2 
(Note): Based on "ChronologIcal Table of ForeIgn Trade" prepared by the Fmance 
Ministry. and indices for foreign trade volume as investigated by the Yokohama 
Specie Bank. 
Fluctuations in Foreign Exchange Rate 
Years Against New Yark I (Dollar) Against London I (Shilling-Pence) Against Paris (Franc) 
Average (per ¥ 100) I Average (per ¥ 1) I Average (per ¥ 1) 
1929 46.07 1-10.8 11.62 
1930 49.37 2-00.3 12.51 
1931 48.87 2-01.9 12.35 
1932 28.12 1-07.2 7.04 
1933 25.23 1-02.4 5.07 
1934 29.51 1-02.1 4.49 
1935 28.57 1-02.0 4.33 
1936 25.95 1-02.0 4.83 
1937 28.81 1-02.0 7.15 
1938 28.50 1-02.0 9.88 
1939 25.98 1-02.1 10.32 
1940 23.44 1-02.0 10.46 
(Note): Based on the mvestigation by the Tokyo Bank. 
about to regain its former shape, registering an increase of 23 % in exports 
and 16 % in imports, as compared with the preceding year. The amount of 
import excess, standing at ¥ 21,000,000, it is noted, was the minimum figure 
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ever registered after the first World War. On the other hand, Yen's exchange 
late against the American dollar continued to decline, it sometimes coming 
down to the level of $ 25 against ¥ 100. 
The decline in the exchange rate was unfavorable for imports while it 
was a factor encouraging for exports. In 1933, the Law for the Control of 
Foreign Exchange was promulgated. Early that year, America was beset by 
a financial panic, which led to a gold embargo in March and a series of 
inflationary measures. The yen, however, was then linked with the pound 
sterling, and, on that account, could be stabilized on a low exchange rate. 
The stability at a low rate of mere 40 % of the value at par led the export 
prices to decline despite the high price level prevailing on the domestic mar-
ket, and prompted the Japanese goods to make inroad on the world market. 
In 1934, both exports and imports surpassed the level as prevailed in 1929, 
and, in 1935, the exports amounted in value to ¥ 2,499,000,000 and the 
imports to ¥ 2,472,000,000, the former easily surpassing the 1925 level and 
the trade balance recording a favorable turn which had not been seen since 
1918. The remarkable expansion of Japan's foreign trade was accused inter-
nationally as a result of social dumping launched with the low wage as a 
powerful weapon. The ac-
cusation was on the ground 
that Japanese merchandise 
made inroads on the world 
market at the sacrifice of her 
workers. 
The following table shows 
the contemporary structure of 
Japan's foreign trade. 
Striking about the incre-
ase in the exports was the fact 
that the percentage of machi-
nes, minerals, metals and che-
micals substantially grew. 
This is presumed to have 
been indicative of the re-or-
ganization of Japan's economy 
into heavy from light indu-
stries, prompted by the requi-
rements of the Manchurian 
Incident. In spite of this, 
the. fact should not be over-
Exports and Imports as Classified into Items (in %) 
Items 11929 11931 1193411936 
Total volume of exports 
E Fibre products 
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100.0 100.0 100.0 
66.1 60.3 58.3 
5.8 7.3 7.6 
2.6 5.8 6.5 
3.5 4.7 5.8 
9.0 8.0 7.6 
13.0 13.9 14.2 
1100.0 100.0 100.0 
32.1 41.5 39.5 
10.4 8.9 10.7 
8.3 13.8 14.9 
6.6 6.3 5.5 
7.8 10.2 8.0 
13.9 8.6 10.0 
20.9 10.7 11.4 
(Note): Based on the "Chronological Table of Fore~ 
ign Trade" compiled by the Finance Ministry. 
* Including non-ferrous minerals. 
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looked that manufactures of medium and small-scale industries, including 
electric bulbs, matches, rubber products and bicycles, comprising merchandise 
included in item "Miscellaneous" in foreign trade classified tables, actually 
occupied the position of representative export items. Fibre products, mean-
while, continued to occupy a virtual majority of the exports. That these 
merchandise, in the face of sustained accusations about exchange or social 
dumpings, could playa vital role in acquiring foreign currency, with which 
to buy war materials, should be viewed with a special importance. 
In 1933, Japan's cotton textiles, on the strength of cheapness, took the 
hegemony from British manufactures. In the volume exported, Japan led the 
entire world; Japan-made textiles, in spite of high tariff barriers, advanced to 
vast markets in China, southeast Asiatic regions, east Africa and South Ame-
rica. This inevitably brought about a bitter competition with foreign Powers, 
which, in turn, prompted the division of world into blocs, as witness the 
Ottawa Agreement of 1932. 
In 1936, Japan's exports began to show signs of decline, big export in-
dustries, like spinning and rayon industries, were forced to curtail their opera-
tion. The import items, on the other hand, clearly indicated the effect of 
the Manchurian Incident with an increased percentage for non-ferrous metals 
and minerals, mineral oils, mineralmetals, chemical materials (including pulp, 
raw rubber, etc.). Corresponding to the position of fibre products in the ex-
port items, which continued to occupy a majority of the exports, imports of 
fibre materials continued on an unabated scale.· Reflecting the prosperity in 
the munitions industry again, more internal combustion engines, metal and 
wood engineering machines, rather than spinning machines, came to be im-
ported during this period. 
VI. World War II and State Control of Foreign Trade. 
This period is not included in the "The Classified Annals of Japan's 
Foreign Trade," where 1932 is the last year referred to. 
Following the outbreak of the second World War, Japan's foreign trade 
took a trend for diminution, this being clearly indicated in figures from about 
1941. The table below shows a comprehensive trade balance III the period 
under review. 
As early as 1931 there were indications that capitalism III Japan was 
gradually coming under State control. Strengthened trade control and the 
formation of bloc economy were obvious manifestation of the tendency. 
The development of the Manchurian Incident brought Manchuria into 
spotlight, which was destined to play the part of the supply source of materials 
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1935--42 Comprehensive Balance and Balance in Yen-Bloc, 





Exports I Imports I Balance I Exports I Imports I Balance I Exports I Imports I Balance 
2,499 2,472 + 27 575 350 + 225 1,924 2,122 - 198 
2,693 2,764 - 71 658 394 + 264 2,035 2,370 - 335 
3,175 2,783 -608 791 438 + 353 2,384 3,345 - 961 
2,690 2,663 + 27 1,166 564 + 602 1,524 2,099 - 575 
3,576 918 +658 1,747 683 + 1,064 1,829 2,235 - 406 
3,656 3,453 +203 1,867 756 + 1, III 1,789 2,697 - 908 
2,651 2,899 -248 1,659 855 + 804 992 2,044 - 1,052 
1,793 1,751 + 42 1,513 1,222 + 291 280 529 - 249 
(Note): Based on the "Chronological Table of Foreign Trade," compiled by 
the Finance Ministry . 
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.including Kwantung Province, which occupied mere 6.8 % of Japan's foreign 
trade volume in 1931, rose to 18.5 % in 1936, surpassed only by America 
with 22.6 %. Keeping pace with the increased investments for exploitation 
of untapped resources in the area along the South Manchuria Railway Com-
pany, a "Japan-Manchuria bloc economy," mainly intended for military 
purposes, was brought into being. 
With outbreak of the China Incident in 1937, Japan's economy was placed 
under State control, comprehensively and drastically, and foreign trade, likewise, 
was similarly affected. In January, 1937, several months prior to the start of the 
Incident, the Law for Foreign Trade Control, formulated in 1933, was revised, 
as a result of which a special sanction by the Finance Minister came to be 
required for foreign exchange amounting to more than ¥ 30,000 per month. 
However, this measure, in e.sense, was nothing less than a measure for indi-
rect import restriction for the purpose of preventing an impending collapse 
of the exchange market in consequence to the worsening trade balance in 
1936. To sustain the exchange market, the specie export was commenced 
from March that year. In July, with the start of the war with China, the 
Finance Minister was empowered to prohibit any foreign exchange amounting 
to more than ¥ 1,000 unless he issues a special grant for such. In December, 
the amount was further reduced to ¥ 100. Prior to this,in August the same 
year, a Law for Adjustment of Foreign Trade and Domestic Industries was 
promulgated, which virtually ushered in a period of fullfledged and direct 
foreign trade control. In response to this, the Law for Export Cooperatives 
hitherto in force was replaced by a Law for Foreign Trade Cooperatives, fol-
lowed, in September, by a Law for Emergency Provisional Measures regar-
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ding Export and Import Goods. In October, it was actually put into force 
following the promulgation of the Regulation on Provisional Export and Im-
port Sanctions, which, together with the "Law for Provisional Capital Adjust-
ment, a control legislation in the sphere of capital, constituted two of the 
wartime economy, and, in this sense, were closely related to the National Mo-
bilization Law, comprising the State programs for material mobilization, na-
tionwide rationing, control of consumption and labor, enforced in July, 1938. 
Ever since the great crisis of 1929, the world economy, despite occasional 
fluctuations, failed to recover prosperity, and, as early as the latter part of 
1937, had to face another impending crisis. As clearly indicated in the already 
quoted tables, Japan's total exports, which amounted to ¥ 3,175,000,000 in 
1937, dropped to ¥ 2,690,000,000 in the following year, registering a substan-
tial decrease of ¥ 485,000,000, 93.3 % of which, amounting to ¥ 477,000,000 
in value, was occupied by fibre products, including raw silk, cotton, rayon, 
silk and woollen textiles. The imports, also, registered a decline during the 
same period. Characteristic of the import condition, then, was the compara-
tive increase of the imports of mineral oils, iron ore, machines and other war 
materials against a drastic decline of the imports of materials for three major 
export industries, including cotton, rayon pulp and wool. This - no doubt, 
the direct consequence of the enforcement of the above-mentioned Export and 
Import Provisional Measures - however, entailed diminished exports, which, 
darkening the prospect for obtaining foreign currency, was liable, it was feared, 
to make difficult further active import of the badly-needed war materials. 
The circumstance gave birth to the "export-import link system." The 
Foreign Exchange Revolving Fund, founded in 1938, was intended to imple-
ment it in respect to the required fund. Under the system, export of certain 
designated commodities would guarantee the import of a fixed amount of raw 
materials needed for their manufacture, on the one hand, while, export of 
commodities by using such materials was made obligatory on the other. For 
the purpose of acquiring as much foreign currency as possible, the exports to 
the Yen bloc regions were exempted from the application of the system, while 
domestic consumption of imported materials, except for special purposes, was 
banned. 
Together with the measures for promoting exports to the "Third-natio-
nal " market under the link system, similar measures were taken for the Yen 
bloc regions. On the basis of the Material Mobilization Programs enacted 
in November 1938, plans of development in North China and Central China 
were under way, and the Japan-Manchuria bloc economy, unavoidably, deve. 
loped into a triangular bloc economy among Japan, Manchuria"-and China, 
this being principally for the purpose of securing materials for Japan's muni-
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tions industry. And, for this, vast quantities of both materials and capital 
for exploitation were required. 
Japan's trade with the Yen bloc regions during the period under review 
invariably ended in a favorable balance, while that with the third-national 
market continued unfavorable balance sheets, the tendency being steadily in-
tensified from the start of the China War up to 1941. 
Under the Circumstance, the export of consumption goods to the Yen 
bloc areas had to be curtailed. In September, 1939, the Ministry of Com-
merce and Industry promulgated a decree concerning control of exports to 
Kwantung Province, Manchoukuo and China, which was intended to directly 
restrict the volume of exports to the Yen bloc. Its effect, however, was coun-
ter-balanced by the Price-Stop Decree, enforced on September 18, that year, 
which made even bigger the discrepancy in prices on the domestic market and 
in the Yen bloc regions. 
In September, 1939, hostilities started between Germany, and Britain and 
France. In September, 1940, the Tripartite Military Alliance was signed 
among Japan, Germany and Italy, while the conflict between Japan and the 
United States, being intensified ever since the abrogation of the Japan-U. S. 
Treaty of Commerce in January, the same year, carne to the fore after Ja-
panese invasion of the northern part of French Indo-China. This was im-
mediately followed by American announcing embargo of scrap iron and steel 
to Japan. In July, 1941, the Japan-French Indo-China Joint Defence Agree-
ment was concluded, followed by Japan's advance into the southern part of 
Indo-China. This was immediately answered by Britain and the United States 
in the form of a freezing of Japanese assets as well as embargo of petro-
leum. In this way, the hostilities in Europe and the war in the southeast 
Asiatic regions were closely intertwined to each other, to develop into a vir-
tual global conflict. 
. With the start of the Pacific War in December, 1941, Japan's trade with 
the third-national market carne to a virtual standstill, and was confined to 
French Indo-China, the Philippines, Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), Thailand 
and the occupied areas in the South - a form of international trade contem-
porarily known by the name of the Greater East Asia Co·Prosperity Sphere. 
State control of trade, in the meantime, was further strengthened. Ear-
lier, in May, 1941, the Trade Control Decree was promulgated, and, in the 
following year, the Trade Control Society was formed as a relevant executive 
organ. This developed into a better-organized entity, Koeki Eidan (Foreign 
Trade Corporation) in March, 1943. 
The Pacific War forced Japan's foreign trade to drastically curtail its 
scale and scope. The trade volume for 1942 was about a half of what it 
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was for 1941, the year of the start of the war. Even Japan's trade with the 



















Exports and Imports as Classified into Countries of Destination. 








EXP.\ Imp. \ ~~~~ \ Exp.\ Imp. \ ~~~ I Exp.\ I \Ba1-\ mp. ance EXP.\ 
1,793 1,752 41 1,627 1,924 -297 1,298 1,946 -647 388 
422 41 381 317 39 278 258 29 228 51 
1,091 1,181 
- 90 983 1,283 -300 859 1,660 -801 320 
1,513 1,222 291 1,299 1,322 - 23 1,016 1,689 -673 371 
144 224 - 80 97 132 - 35 22 22 - 0.5 2 
66 167 -100 88 49 37 11 10 1 3 
I 7 - 6 30 55 - 25 37 17 20 I . 
16 13 3 56 100 -44 40 66 - 27 4 
4 12 - 7 13 5 8 10 6 4 0 
0 2 - 2 15 82 - 67 17 65 -48 0 
1 7 - 7 3 19 - 16 5 12 - 7 0 














42 - 42 
0 0 
3 - 3 
(Note): Based on UForeign Trade Table" compiled by the Finance Ministry. 
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VIT. Characteristic Features of Japan's Pre-war Foreign Trade. 
From the tracing in brief of the development of Japan's foreign trade 
since the early years of Meiji, as described in the foregoing pages, it may 
probably be said that the characteristic features of Japan's trade in pre-war 
years consisted in its dependence on the advanced Capitalistic countries and 
its aggressive inroads in Japan's colonial areas and subordinate countries. 
Such, indeed, was a faithful reflection on foreign trade of the aspects of capital-
istic institutions which witnessed a peculiar growth and development in Japan, 
while, at the same time, such was a destiny for the Japanese version of Capi-
talism which, lagging behind the Western Powers, had to take part in Com-
petition on the international market at a time when world capitalism was 
gradually entering into an imperialistic phase of development. 
The structure of Japanese trade merchandise and trade market in the pre-
war years may be summarised as follows 
( 1) First route. 
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Raw silk was exported, and, cotton, crude oils and high-class machineries 
were imported. Japan's trade with America, had the pattern of the backward 
nations .. 
Raw silk, a purely Japanese-produced trade item, used to occupy an impor-
tant place in Japan's pre-war exports, next only to cotton textiles. In this 
.sense, it was a virtual "starting point" of Japan's trade, while, on the other 
,hand, it, as a luxury item, had to depend on the business fluctuations in 
America. Japan's export of raw silk was undertaken on the basis of obsolete 
production relations and methods, and, for the expansion of her economy, 
Japan had to depend to a large measure on more advanced Capitalist Powers, 
which could supply her with whatever raw materials she was in need of. 
( 2) Second Route. 
Cotton textiles were exported, and, in return, raw materials for heavy 
industries, including iron ore, pig iron, non-ferrous metals, alminium, raw rub-
.ber, etc., were imported. Japan's trade with the Southeast Asiatic countries 
was, in substance, a mixture of the pattern of the developed nations and that 
of the backward nations. 
From the fact that most of these areas constituted European, mainly, 
British colonies and subordinates, Japan's trade with them inevitably was tin.,. 
ged more with an imperialistic hue. In the intense competition with the 
Lancashire spinning industry fought in these regions, Japan's weapons could 
be found only in low wages in her spinning industry and the support of me-
dium and small-scaled enterprises in her textile industry. In this respect, Ja-
pan had to assume the role of a backward nation. 
( 3) Third Route. 
Fibre and heavy industrial products were exported and foodstuffs and raw 
materials for heavy chemical industry was imported. Japan was principally 
engaged in trade with Manchuria and China (trade with Korea and Formosa 
comes under this category). Japan's trade, here, had the pattern of the adv-
anced nations, which was an outward expression of the rapid growth of Japan's 
capitalism, which had to start belatedly, lagging behind some of the Western 
Powers, while, at the same time, it should be noted with special attention 
,that these areas, Korea and Manchuria, served as factors to stimulate further 
growth of Japan's foreign trade during this period. Japan's advance, however, 
was made possible on the sacrifice of the livelihood of local people and on 
the monopolization of regional resources, and, on this account, was destined 
to face a bitter and wide-spread racial resistance. 
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Part II Post-War Problems of Japan's Foreign Trade 
I. Balance of Payments. 
It is needless to point out that international payments consist of current 
accounts and capital accounts. Compared with capital accounts, current ac-
counts are of more importance, and, in current accounts, balance of trade con-
stitute an item of such manifest importance that the situation of the balance 
of trade will often indicate the comprehensive situation of a country's balance 
of payments. In this sense, our analysis of Japan's trade condition will start 
with a brief description of the situation of her international payments. 
The year 1953 offers an interesting instance. In this year, the Korean 
War ended with an armistice, and this started a business recession in America. 
-Many probably still remember a statement made by a noted Soviet economist, 
Professor Valga, to the effect that the business recession will be certain to de-
velop into a worldwide economic crisis. Amidst such business decline, Japan's 
balance of payments condition likewise witnessed a turn to the worse. The 
White Paper on Foreign Trade published by the Japanese Government in 1954 
-said to the following effect: 
"In 1953, Japan's foreign trade failed to see any remarkable recovery in 
exports, on one hand, and saw a substantial increase in imports, on the other, 
which, naturally, resulted in big import excess, while income from special pro-
curement recorded a, slight decline as compared with the preceding year. Such 
decrease in income and big increase in payments unavoidably forced the condi-
tion of Japan's balance of payments in 1953 to register a big-scale unfavorable 
balance for the first time in several preceding years. The situation, indeed, is 
such that no easy optimism will be warranted." 
Note: White Paper on Foreign Trade, 1954, p. 7. 
The excess imports in 1953 amounted in value to about $ 950,000,000, 
which, coupled with excess payments in freightage and insurance charges, would 
come up to about $ 1,000,000,000 in deficit. This, even covered with $ 800, 
000,000 gained by special procurement orders, still left a deficit in foreign cur-
rency nearly amounting to $ 200,000,000. To counter this, need of suppres-
sing imports and encouraging exports through a policy of deflation was not 
only stressed but was actually put into practice. Only two years after this, 
another White Paper on Foreign Trade, 1956, in part, stated as follows: 
"Foreign Trade in 1955 continued in a highly satisfactory condition. 
Exports registered a big stride upward even surpassing the level of the preced-
ing year, which was sufficiently satisfactory, while imports remained generally 
on the same level as the preceding year, which resulted in big gains in foreign 
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exchange despite a decrease in special procurements. The fact that such gains 
were made possible on the strength of foreign trade payments alone should be 
noted with special interest especially since Japan had made it one of her major 
goals to establish an autonomous economy not aided by special procurement." 
Note: White Paper on Foreign Trade, 1956, p. I 
The prosperity was enjoyed and the business expanded. But the situation 
changed again. One year later the white paper of 1957 stated as follows: 
"Balance of payment in 1956 could have the surplus of $ 290,000,000, 
but the surplus decreased rapidly compared with the preceding year, because 
of the increase of import. Especially this tendency became remarkable in the 
latter half of the year and in 1957 the balance continued to show the large 
deficit" 
Note: White paper on foreign trade, 1957 pp. 1-2 
The three White Papers on Foreign Trade, quoted above, amply show 
that the situation of Japan's international payments are highly unstable and 
that the counter-measures adopted by the Japanese Government to meet it have 
been extremely extemporaneous. The authorities of the Japanese Government, 
as a matter of fact, have invariably evinced an attitude of pessimism as the 
balance of payment balance turned to the worse, and, as soon as a favorable 
balance was in witness, they reversed their attitude and voiced optimism. Be-
low will be given a table of the balance of payments of Japan which were 
responsible for the series of the Foreign Trade White Papers as quoted above. 
The table pertains to the balance of payment situation as classified into various 
currency areas, as prevailed between 1951 and 1956, compiled on the basis 
of foreign exchange. 
Table of the balance of Payments Situation (Unit: $ 1,000,000) (Note: Based on 
foreign exchange statistics; * mark indicates a figure not amounting to $ 1,000,000) 
-.------ Currency Entire Dollar Steriing 
areas area area area 
Years 
1951 
Trade balance -428 -678 134 
(Exports) (1,296) (302) (563) 
(Imports) (1,725) (980) (429) 
Freightage, insurance 
charges, etc. 116 124 7 
Special procurement, 585 578 7 
military spendings 
Net of current 273 24 134 transactions 
Net of capital 
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1955 
Trade balance 106 -113 196 23 
(Exports) (1,954) (759) (729) (466) 
(Imports) (1,848) (871) (533) (443) 
Freightage, jnsurance 
- 151 - 70 - 71 10 charges, etc. 
Special procurement, 
military spendings 559 545 II 3 
Net of current 514 362 136 16 transactions 
Net of capital 
- 20 
- 3 - 16 transactions 
Foreign currency 
received 494 359 120 15 
1956 
Trade balance -68 - 81 40 - 9 
(Exports) (2,403) (1,098) (905) (375) 
(Imports) (2,470) (1,179) (864) (384) 
Freightage, insurance 
-189 - 55 -116 - 14 
charges, etc. 
Special procurement, 
military spendings 595 592 4 
Net of current 338 456 72 - 23 transactions 
Net of Capital 





- 86 - 23 
As shown in the above table, the balance of payments in 1953 ended in 
excess payments, which evidently prompted the government authorities to make 
reference to an economic crisis in the Foreign Trade White Paper released in 
the following year. The alleged crisis began to ameliorate in 1954, and, in 
1955, the foreign currency situation showed a still further improvement, a fact 
which accounts for the highly optimistic tone pervading the 1956 White Paper. 
The apparent prosperity, however, lasted for a brief period, for, after reaching 
a peak in 1955, the trend, again, was obviously downward, it persisting onto 
1957, when the tempo for worsening was even further speeded up, 
Needless to say, it is worthwhile to make a scientific analysis of the ba-
lance of payments situation as it fluctuates over a short period, and, on the 
basis of which work out effective counter-measures. It may not be denied, in 
this sense, that the series of trade policies adopted in post-war Japan have al-
ways failed to go abreast of the impending changes, and that, because of a 
poverty of adequate and proper measures on hand, the national economy of 
Japan had been forced to suffer a considerable loss durin!? the ~everal post. 
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war years. A thing which should be emphasized still more loudly in this con-
nection is the utter inability of the Japanese Government to have available a 
long-term perspective of the situation, and, the complete lack, on their part, 
of an adequate policy to meet the situation. It may even be pointed out that 
the lack of a long-term perspective actually accounted for their failure in grasp-
ing the reality of the situation at hand. That an improvement seen in Japan's 
international payments in 1955 was hastily mistaken for a sign that her eco-
nomy was beginning to stand an its own foot was not unrelated to such lack 
of a long-term perspective. Then, where should be found the salient features 
of Japan's balance of payments situation as seen from a point of view of a 
long-term perspective or from that of the structural setup of Japanese economy? 
First should be noted is the fact that, through post-war years, Japan's 
balance of payments have chronically been suffering from excess payments, the 
resulting deficit being covered up with whatever Japan could garner from the 
precarious special procurement orders, with the year 1955 as the sole exception. 
Now, the special procurement, needless to say, works on an extremely preca-
rious and unstable basis. Consti tuting special spendings out of the overall 
military expenditures of America, it naturally depends entirely on her specific 
desires and stands wholly out of the confines of any self-formulated policy 
Japan may be inclined to adopt. Moreover, it is unavoidable that it is bound 
to link up Japan's economy with the military economy of America. Of course, 
it would be too much to define the entire range of special procurement as 
Japan's balance of Payment in 1936 (Unit: $ 1.000,000) 
Current transactions I -Iii Government grants· 
General exports (FOB) 1,016.4. Total (2) 
General imports (FOB) 1,027.2 Errors and omissions (3) 
(Balance) (-11.8) Surplus and deficit 
Other exports (FOB) (1)+(2)+(3) 
Other import (FOB) Capital transactions 
(Balance) Civilian 
(Balance of commodity Long-term capital 
transactions) (-11.8) Short.term capital 
Freightage, insurance 68.2 Total 
charges Government 
Income from investments 50.4 Long-term capital 
Receipts from military Short.term capital Spendings 
Others 
-33.9 Total 
Total (I) 62.9 Flow of gold 
Grants Grant total 
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spendings for military supplies, and, seen in this way, it would not be exactly 
reasonable to assert that the special procurement tends to "militarize" the 
entire scope of Japan's economy, although there is no denying the fact that 
the latter, through the special procurement orders, is closely related to the 
military economy of America. This is to say, in other words, that Japanese 
economy is constantly exposed to dangers and risks inherent in America's mili-
tary economy. 
It would be illuminating to be reminded of the fact that even in pre-
war years, excess imports in many cases constituted a chronic phenomenon as 
far as Japan's foreign trade was concerned, which is eloquently illustrated 
by the figures. 
Although Japan's balance of payments in pre-war years experienced a chro-
nic adverse balance, the deficit used to be covered up with the non-trade income 
including freightage and insurance charges. Such extra items in the balance 
of payments, of course, were within the confines of the autonomous policy Ja-
pan would decide on. 
Constituting the second feature of Japan's post-war foreign trade payments 
was the fact that the scope and 
scale of her foreign trade became 
much smaller as compared with 
what it was before the war. 
Even in 1956, when the im-
ports surpassed what they were in 
pre-war years, the exports barely 
amounted to 86 % of the pre-war 
figures. 
Where dose, such structural 
Comparison of Pre-War and Post-War 





















features of Japan's foreign trade come from? To explain this, a brief descrip-
tion will be necessary of the post-war characteristics of Japan's and world's 
economy. 
n. Japan's Econo:my and ;Foreign Trade 
As is well known, japan's pre-war economy depended much on her for-
eign trade. As far as figures show, however, her economy after the war de-
pends less· on foreign tradd. It may be presumed that such a change has been 
brought about by a drastic change in both domestic and international condi-
tion. In spite of this, it should be pointed out that Japan's economy in post-
war years inherits much from its pre-war shape in respect to her industrial and 
agricultural setup as well as the status of her popUlation and natural resources. 
Thus, a glance will be made of the characteristic features of post-war economy 
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of Japan and her foreign trade in the fonn of a comparison between the pre-
and post-war situations. First the extent to which her economy depended on 
foreign trade will be briefly reviewed. 





































The White Paper on Economy 
released in 1956 explains the rea-
son for such decrease in the eco-
nomy's dependence on foreign trade, 
in the following vein: 
" First, regarding imports, de-
crease of imports of cotton as a 
consequence to natural fibres being 
rapidly replaced by chemical fibres, 
and the reduction brought in the 
imports of finished and semifinished 
products due to Japan's capacity 
to supply machines, ammonium 
sulfate, pig iron, glass and pulp, may be counted as directly responsible 
for it. Of course, the fact that the production of metal, machine and 
chemical industries have witnessed a remarkable increase as compared with 
pre-war years has amply covered up the drop in the imports. Compared with 
the case of importing cotton and manufacturing I yard of cotton cloth from 
it, manufacture of synthetic fibres from coal and carbide involves a far more 
expanded productive process, entailing a larger income. This proves of expan-
ded production is a barometer of the extent to which heavy chemical indust-
ries will have grown, and this latter makes it able to depend less and less on 
the imports. 
"Such expanded process of production requires a high degree of invest-
ments. The heavy requirements for investments intended for the rehabilitation 
of Japan's post-war economy centering around the increased emphasis on heavy 
chemical industries, have tended to relatively increase the ratio of domestic 
demand as contrasted to export demand, which, again, has mainly accounted 
for the less dependence on imports. Domestic capital accumulation in pre-
war years was less than such demand frolll abroad as exports, but, now, it 
amounts to double the exports. Accordingly, the production of heavy chemi-
cal industries, which has recorded a remarkable increase over the pre-war years, 
has been absorbed in the increased demand for investment as a consequence 
of increased investments, and in the increased demand for productive goods due 
to the expanded productive process. The fact that a major part of exports 
now is occupied by heavy chemical products with less cotton products expor-
ted, is reflected in the reduced dependence on imports through decreased im-
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ports of cotton." 
What the White Paper on Economy tries to stress is the fact that, in post-
war years, Japan's dependence on imports decreased has been due to more 
emphasis being laid on heavy chemical industries, a circumstance which is 
manifest both in respect to imports and exports. The interpretation, probably, 
is correct. It would be erroneous to assume that a specific industry, for exa-
mple, the fibre industry, will indefinitely depend on a certain specific material, 
for example, cotton. 
In the makeup of imports of Japan in pre-war years, a large percentage 
was always occupied by raw cotton, which among others accounted for a high 
dependence on imports. With the development of synthetic fibres after the war, 
the imports of raw cotton decreased. It will also be conceded that the tech-
nical innovation carried out after the war prompted a heavier demand for 
investments, and, as a result of this, the ratio of the demand for exports drop-
ped." 
The present writer, however, would wish to point out an angle of the pro-
blem which the government's White Paper failed to refer to. It pertains 
to the fact that the White Paper, in mentioning the reduced dependence 
on foreign trade, completely ignored the problem of market. That foreign 
markets became smaller and narrower after the war to such an extent that 
endeavor for export could not but end .in failure, may not be denied altoge-
ther. 
Fundamentally, the need for foreign trade under a capitalistic economy 
arises from an unbalanced economic deVelopment in a specific country. Va-
rious industries, which reciprocally ought to offer markets, are, under free and 
unrestricted competition, allowed to achieve an unequal development, with the 
consequence that some of the more advanced industries cannot find an adequate 
market at home and unavoidably tend to turn for possible foreign markets. 
. For instance, when the fibre industry far surpasses agriculture in its growth, 
the industry will not be able to have enough materials available at home and, 
thus, will have to import large quantities of such materials. The industry, 
on the other hand, will find it impossible to find a sufficiently big market at 
home, and, naturally, will have to export much of its products. Even in case 
raw materials are imported because of a short domestic supply, the imports 
will have to be always considered in relation to the particular industry requir. 
ing such raw materials . 
. Here the need for foreign trade under capitalism is apparent. Should a 
sufficiently big foreign market is not found at this juncture, it would be in-
evitable that the country suffers from unemployment and a lowered standard 
; ()( living. In the light of statistical figures available in postwar years, the un-
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balance among the industries is apparently much worse than in pre-war years. 
This ought, naturally, make the dependence on foreign trade higher. How-
ever, as a matter of fact, such dependence is actually less striking now. This 
is entirely due to the less foreign markts available. The apparent contradic-
tion carr be met only by a worsened situation at home relative to employment 
and the standard of living. The following table shed a light on this point. 
Economic Index in Pre. W ar and Post-Wax Years, 
Net national income 
Mining industrial production 
Agricultural production 
Volume of exports 



















In pre-war years, the status of 
agriculture and industry was unba-
lanced. Now, if the pre-war index 
for each of them is put at 100, re-
spectively, the post-war index will 
become 189 for industry and 127 
for agriculture, which amply indi-
cates their respective unbalanced 
growth after the war. On the 
other hand, while the index for 
industrial production stands at 189, 
that for consumption lags at 118, showing a big gap. In the light of the 
situation, the need for foreign trade apparently must have grown even more; 
but, the fact is the index for exports stands at mere 75 and that for imports 
at 94, as compared with the 100 pre-war index. Such manifest drop in the 
country's dependence on foreign trade, as pointed out earlier, is due entirely 
to the smaller foreign markets available, which, again, should effect the situa-
tion of employment and standard of living at home. While the figure for 
employment is lacking in the foregoing table, a manifest lagging in the con-· 
sumption level is only too apparent in the light of the index figures for con-
sumption, population, and industrial production, which stand at 118, 130 and 
189, respectively. 
While, as shown above, Japan's dependence on foreign trade has been CO" 
ming down during the past ten years after the war, it, again, is tending to rise 
keeping pace with the recent growth of Japan's economy, and this, apparently, 
is because the growth of her capitalistic economy is entailing a parallel increase 
of the unbalance among various productions. First to be pointed out in this 
connection is the unbalance seen between industries and agriculture, on the one 
hand, and between industries and mining, on the other, which, together, tend 
to increase Japan's imports of foodstuffs and raw materials 
Regarding the increase of imports in post-war year, the White Paper on 
Economy explains as follows: 
"The increase of imports of raw materials has been especially remarkable 
in metal ore, rubber, oil seeds, raw hide, fibre materials and non-metal ore, in 
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Import Ratio of Principal Commodities (%) 
1191t r1953 I 1954 11955 11956 I 119it'::-;':I-19-5-3 '1-19-5-'411955 1 1956-
Rice 19 12 14 
Wheat 23 56 61 
Barley 1 26 38 
Sugar 97 95 95 
Soya beans 69 50 57 
Coal II 10 7 
Coaking coal 
- 32 28 
Crude oil 94 95 95 
Iron ore 93 80 81 
the order mentioned. The 
increase has kept pace with 
the increase of industrial 
production. The increased 
production of cotton yarn, 
woollen yarn and super-
phosphate lime, leads to a 
proportional increase of 
imports of cotton, wool 
and phosphate rocks. A-
gain, an increased produc-
tion of iron, steel and 
eating oils will increase 
the dependence on the 
imports of raw materials 
needed for their produc-
tion, often with that the 
percentage of the import 
increase surpasses that of 
the production increase. 
In the field of fuel, like-
wise, more crude oils had 
to be imported..... . 
During the past six years, 
the industrial production 
has doubled, while the 
increase of consumption 
I 
10 7 Bauxite· - 100 100 100 100 
61 62 Salt 65 75 80 78 78 
33 45 Phosphate 100 100 100 100 100 
96 96 Raw rubber 100 100 100 100 100 
61 61 Cotton 100 100 100 100 100 
6 8 Wool 100 100 100 100 100 
26 27 Rayon pulp 81 27 27 22 24 
96 97 Abaca 100 100 100 100 100 
78 81 
Export Ratio of Principal Commodities (%) 
~~-














Cotton spinning machines 
Cotton weaving machines 
Sewing machines 
Cameras 







































































































of imported raw materials has been more than 2.34 times-which indicates that 
Japan's industries continue to depend more and more heavily on the imports." 
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In post-war years, Japan's industries have developed more in the field of 
heavy industries, which is exemplified in the increasingly bigger percentage being 
occupied by the exports of heavy chemical products. Notable in this connec-
tion is the rernakable increase of exports of finished chemical products rather 
than that of semifinished ones. 
Productivity and Wages in Iron-Steel and 
Steel Block 
For an expansion of exports, 
reduction of the cost is usually re-
sorted to. In seeking a foreign mar-
ket, the industry should endeavor to 
lower its cost. A survey will now 
be made, based on the White Paper 
on Economy, 1953, released by the 
Japanese Government, of the labor 
productivity, wages and wage cost 
in the iron and steel industry and 












per ton f951 
1952 
Wage 
I U.S.A. IEngland I Japan 
._---
13.89 7.19 3.77 
ton 
14.27 7.08 3.93 
72.63 25.48 12.17 
Dollar 
74.60 28.00 12.57 





of the most representative industries of Japan. 
The above tables show 
that in the steel and iron in-
dustry, Japan's productivity 
stands at 27 % of America's 
and at 56 % of England's, 
respectively, while the lowness 
of Japan's wage level reduces 
her wage-per-ton level consi-
derably below that of Ame-
rica and slightly below that 
Productivity and Wages in Cotton Spinning Industry 
Labor productivity 
(per person and hour) 
Below No. 40 1932 
(all lahorers) 
Wages 
No. 21 1951 
(all laborers) 
1932 
(per person an hour) 
1951 
of England. Wages per pound 1932 
Japan's labor producti-
vity in the cotton spinning 
industry in pre-war years 
1951 
* ten big firms only 



























stood at about 50 % of America and about 70 % 'Of England, respectively. 
The wages paid, however, were far below those paid in these countries and her 
wages per pound stood as low as 15 % of America and 24 % of England. 
After the war, the discrepancy in the labor productivity between Japan and 
America increased, while Japan's productivity stands above that of England. 
With a rise in wages paid in Japan, the discrepancy with England in wage 
has been reduced; however, in the discrepancy in the wage per pound persists 
to a considerable degree. 
Even since the pre-war days, Japan's low cost due to low wage level has 
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often been the target of attack by competing foreign countries. In post-war 
years, Japan has witnessed a substantial rise in the money wages paid. The 
level, however, has lagged below the similar rise in the labor productivity which, 
perhaps, explains the strong potentiality for competition still possessed by J a-
panese export commodities. The White Paper on Economy for 1957 roughly 
runs in a similar vein: 
" . . . . . . .. The rise in the labor productivity has been so rapid which 
brought about a strengthened competitive power in price. While, in Japan, the 
rise in money wages has been quite remarkable, the rise of labor productivity has 
been still more remarkable. .. . Between 1951 and 56, the rise of money wages 
surpassed that of labor productivity in England, America, Germany and France, 
while, in Japan and Italy, the relation was reversed. Of course, it may not 
be denied that the improvement in the export competitive power was largely 
due to the reduction in the cost per unit resulting from advanced technique and 
the consequent improvement in the quality of the exported commodities. But, 
the remarkable rise in the labor productivity has reduced the cost per unit and 
tended to strengthen japan's competitive power, may not be overlooked .. "," 
To illustrate this, the white paper lists the following table: 
Tendency in Labor Productivity and Wages Paid (1956) (1951-100) 
Industrial production I I B 
Employment (A) Wages (B) A 
Japan 167 165 99 
America 112 124 III 
England 109 138 127 
West Germany 126 136 108 
France 136 145 107 
Italy 134 123 92 
Thus, Japan's economy, both in respect to exports and imports, is tending 
to depend more and more on foreign trade. This implies that Japan faces the 
problem of foreign markets with an increasing acuteness. In spite of this, Ja-
pan's dependence on foreign trade, as far as statistical figures are concerned, has 
apparently lessened in post-war years as compared with the prewar period. 
This contradiction will have to be explained by the fact that, in the midst of 
the post-war world political and economic situation, Japan has been forced to 
have less and smaller foreign markets available for her merchandise. 
m. Foreign Trade and World EconolllY 
One of the most striking phenomena in world economy after the end of 
the World War II is the emergence and expansion of the Socialist-domi-
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nated markets. It should not, however, be hastily construed that the emergence 
of a Socialist market at once signifies less foreign markets for Capitalist count~ 
ries. 
That the Capitalist world markets have become smaller in a geopraphical 
sense is not incompatible with the assertion that, in an economic sense, the 
markets have, on the contrary, expanded. Actually, the expansion of world 
trade during the decade after the World War II has been substantially larger 
than that recorded during the decade after the World War I, which should 
imply that the contention that the world markets have been rendered smaller in 
a geograhical sense at once signifies an economic diminution of the markets, is 
erroneous. Nor does the emergence of a Socialist market signify in itself that 
it can never make itself available for Capitalist economy. Apart from a period 
of economic confusion immediately following the Socialist revolution, the deve-
lopment of the Socialist economy gradually tended to offer a market for the 
Capitalist economy. This is amply proved by the insistent call made by the 
Socialist countries for the past several years on Capitalist powers for a peaceful 
co-existence and an expansion of the mutual trade relations. 
The factor which is working to block the so-called East-West trade and 
prevent the desired expansion of international markets on the part of the Capi-
talist countries, is the policy of restricting trade with Socialist countries being 
pursued by the United States and some of its allies. As far as Japan is con-
cerned, her trade with Communist China and certain other Socialist countries 
IS placed under strict control ever since the outbreak of the Korean War in 
Japan's Exports and Imports From Various Continents (%) 
--
Exports , Imports 
1934-1 1 36 1952 53 1 54 1 55 1 56 
1934-1 36 52 1 53 1 54 1 55 1 56 
Asia 64 51 51 49 42 41 53 31 33 31 37 32 
Neighboring 43 13 17 12 8 8 37 5 5 5 4 4 countries 
(China) (18) (*) (*) ( 1) ( I) ( 3) (10) ( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ( 3) ( 3) 
. Southeast 18 36 30 32 28 29 16
1 
21 22 19 21 19 Asia 
Europe 8 14 9 9 10 10 10 7 8 8 7 7 
N. America 17 21 23 21 27 26 25 50 42 46 41 44 
(U.S.A.) (16) (18) (18) (17) (22) (22) (24) (38) ~31) (35) (31) (33) 
S. America 2 3 5 10 7 5 2 2 5 7 4 4 
Africa 6 7 10 8 10 16 3 3 2 2 3 3 
Oceania 3 4 2 3 4 2 7 8 8 6 8 9 
I 
-
'" below 0.5 omuted 
1950 .. Considering the weight of japan's trade for China in pre-war years, the 
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virtual closure of the Chinese maket to Japan's trade after the war has evidently 
played a big role in reducing her dependence on foreign trade in recent years. 
As shown in the above table, Japan's exports to China in 1934-36 oc-
cupied 19 % of her total exports while the percentage dropped to mere 3 % 
in 1956. Various reasons, of course, would be enumerated. for such drastic 
change in the picture, one of the most important being the policy of restriction 
on her trade with people's China which the Japanese Government adopts in 
pursuance of the United States policy. In 1956, Japan's exports to new China 
totalled $ 67,339,000 and imports $ 83,647,000. Principal among the exported 
commodities were chemical medicines, yarns and textiles, while the percentage 
of the exports of such construction materials as metal products and machineries, 
urgently needed by China's economy, was negligible. This was because these 
commodities are included in the list of banned goods. The items of imports, 
on the other hand, include, among others, foods and materials for light 
industries, a low percentage being occupied by the imports of such items as 
iron ore, strong coking coal and table salt which are indispensably required 
by japan's economy. 
As another important characteristics of world economy after the end of the 
World War II should be mentioned a striking unbalance in the extent of growth 
among the Capitalist countries, the most striking being that existing be-
tween the United States and other Capitalist countries. This circumstance is 
eloquently exemplified in the so-called dollar shortage, which has amounted to 
such an extent that it is forcefully interrupting with further growth of world 
trade. Japan's case is no exception to this. Despite the unconditionally pro-
American policy being followed by the current conservative regime in Japan, 
the existing unbalance between the American-Japanese exports and imports is 
proving a serious obstacle to further expansion of trade relation between the 
two countries. Japan's trade with America in 1956, for instance, included 
$ 543,306,000 for exports and $ 1,064,540,000 for imports, registering an import 
excess nearly amounting to $ 500,000,000. To make the situation worse, there 
are indications that the United States will further strengthen the currently-
imposed restrictions on the imports from Japan, 
While the post-war decrease of japan's trade with Communist China, on the 
pne hand, and the expansion of her trad~ relations with America, on the other, is 
indicative of the prevailing economic situation of the world; several issues which 
are liable to have an important bearing on the future of Japan's foreign trade, 
may be pointed out in this connection. Reference will be made to the table 
shown below, compiled by M.Hideo Y onezawa of the China Research Institute. 
These tables clearly show that the vital raw materials, listed there, which 
were imported maiqly from Chin;! in the pre-war period I becam~ to be imported 
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Imports of Iron Ore, Coal, Salt and Soya Beans from 
China and America (% against total imports) 
11934-361 1950, 1951 1952 
Iron ore China 34.0 18.7 1.3 0.8 
America 33.6 36.9 
Coal China 68.4 58.8 1.1 0.8 
America 13.9 70.9 79.3 
Salt China 38.6 8.6 0.2 0.1 
America 2.8 10.6 7.0 
Soya Beans China 71.3 56.5 2.6 0.4 
America 43.5 93.7 96.9 
Import Price of Iron Ore. Coal, Salt and Soya Beans 





















































from the United States after 
1950 when the Korean War 
broke out. The price of 
these commodities, except 
soya beans is much cheaper 
imported from China than 
imported from America, as 
indicated in the table above. 
It would not be perti-
nent, however, to assert, in 
the light of these figures, that 
Japan's trade should return 
to its prewar shape, for the 
conditions of trade of both 
the world and Japan have by 
now undergone a drastic 
change. On the other hand, 
again, the present status of 
Japan's trade could by no 
means be considered utter! y 
normal. 
First, to be pointed out 
in this connection, is the fact 
that the unbalance in evi-
dence in the American-Ja-
panese relations constitutes 
one of the biggest factors 
resulting the unbalanced 
state of Japan's balance of 
payments. In respect to the 
categories of commodities 
and the cost involved, the major part of the imports from America could be 
presumably shifted to the imports from China. Now new China at the pre-
sent moment follows the barter system as her foreign trade formula, and, there-
fore, the imports of so much volume will at once mean reciprocal increase 
of exports to a similar level, which will be highly instrumental to achieving 
the goal of balanced international payments. 
Secondly comes the question of the cost of Japanese merchandise. Ever 
since the pre-war period, Japan's foreign trade could expand aided by low 
wages and low cost, the same conditions persisting in the post-war days, while the 
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issue is closely and fundamentally related to the structural organization of Ja-
pan's Capitalist economy, a tentative solution would be found in the imports 
of cheap-priced raw materials, and this, in turn, will inevitably bring the pro-
blem of China trade up to the fore. 
Thus, the importance of japan's trade with China in post-war years is 
obvious. The solution of the issue of China trade, however, will not lead to 
the solution of all other issues pending. Basically, the problems facing Japan's 
foreign trade comprise, domestically, the problems of the structural organiza-
tion of her industries as well as the cost involved and, internationally, the 
problems of world markets with the issue of China trade included therein. 
